Dynamic Justice: How "Dynamic+" Injunctions Are Reshaping Fraud Litigation

Sidharth S Kumar and Prachi Rungta

India's digital-economy boom has pulled millions of new retail investors into formal finance, and concurrently handed fraudsters a fresh pool of targets. Sophisticated scammers now impersonate banks, fintechs and investment firms across messaging platforms, weaponising trusted corporate identities. The fallout reaches far beyond individual victims: impersonated institutions face regulatory scrutiny, brand damage, eroded customer trust and an unsustainable compliance burden from round-the-clock monitoring and takedowns. The result is an urgent need for judicial remedies that do more than react after the damage is done.

Courts Catch Up to the Con

Recognising the systemic threat to the banking, investment and fintech sectors, the Indian judiciary has shifted from chasing individual fraudsters to dismantling the infrastructure that enables them. Early John Doe ex-parte injunctions blocked specific rogue accounts, but forced victims back to court every time fraudsters migrated to a new domain or number. Courts answered with “dynamic” injunctions, which automatically extend protection to mirror sites and successor accounts without a fresh lawsuit, and “dynamic+” injunctions, which reach fraudulent content not yet created.[1] Reinforcing this, courts have held that conditional safe-harbour immunity under Section 79 of the Information Technology Act (“IT Act”) is contingent on due diligence and the platforms cannot hide behind encryption or system architecture to escape their duty to disrupt fraud within thirty-six hours.[2]

When the Fraudster Is an Algorithm

Artificial intelligence raises the stakes sharply. Frontier models can scale personalised victim outreach, generate flawless forged documents and produce hyper-realistic deepfakes of corporate executives. The judiciary has begun to respond: in recent preliminary observations — though not in a fraud case — the Calcutta High Court[3] indicated that platforms which actively generate or alter content using generative AI may be classified as “originators” rather than “intermediaries” under the IT Act. The distinction is decisive. An intermediary that merely hosts or transmits third-party content can claim conditional safe-harbour protection; an originator cannot. An AI-driven platform that generates or facilitates a fraudulent solicitation could therefore face direct, absolute liability for the resulting financial harm.

The Institutional Playbook

The Courts are adopting an outcome-based accountability trajectory that targets whoever is best placed to mitigate systemic risk. For banks, fintechs and investment firms, timely judicial recourse is now a core protective strategy, not a last resort. Institutions should proactively secure ‘dynamic’ and ‘dynamic+’ injunctions so relief survives as fraudulent operations evolve. The moment fraud is detected, legal teams should seek orders compelling intermediaries to disclose subscriber KYC and trace data, then use that intelligence to file structured complaints on the National Cybercrime Reporting Portal — turning anonymous actors into identifiable defendants under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita and the IT Act. Pairing strategic litigation with operational diligence lets financial institutions disrupt fraud infrastructure, enforce intermediary accountability and safeguard their digital enterprises.

[1] Indmoney Tech Private Limited & Anr. v. Ashok Kumar And Ors., CS(COMM) 744/2025 (Delhi High Court, 2025).

[2] DBS Bank India Ltd. v. John Doe(s)/Ashok Kumar(s) & Ors., Interim Application (L) No. 13639 of 2026 in Commercial IP Suit (L) No. 12187 of 2026 (Bombay High Court, 2026).

[3] IndiaMART InterMESH Limited v. OpenAI Inc. and Others, IA No. GA-COM/1/2025 in IP-COM/57/2025 (Calcutta High Court, 2026).